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Full-stack, one team

Nominal

ARGV

Hardware security

In development

ARGV-SEC

A security key for the real sign-in.

A compact FIDO2 authenticator for phishing-resistant access, designed around a deliberately small hardware and firmware surface.

Device brief

Less hardware. Clearer intent.

ARGV-SEC keeps its human interface narrow enough to understand at a glance. Every control maps to an authentication requirement.

Confirmation

Physical button

Captures an explicit user-presence gesture before an operation completes.

Local verification

User PIN

Supplies the knowledge factor; no fingerprint sensor or biometric enrollment is part of the device.

Resident capacity

8 accounts max

Keeps the discoverable credential store bounded and straightforward to manage.

Protocol path

The browser asks. The authenticator decides.

The security boundary stays visible: the website owns the request, the host owns transport, and ARGV-SEC owns the credential operation.

Web application

Origin-bound request

WebAuthn creates a registration or sign-in request for the service currently open in the browser.

Host client

Standard transport

The platform translates the request into CTAP messages carried over USB HID.

ARGV-SEC

Signed response

The authenticator selects the local credential, evaluates policy, and returns an assertion.

Security model

A credential that cannot be typed into the wrong place.

FIDO authentication replaces shared-password exchange with service-specific public-key proof.

Scoped to the real service

Each credential is tied to a relying-party identifier, so a look-alike domain cannot request a valid assertion for the genuine service.

No reusable secret on the server

The service stores a public key instead of an authentication secret that can be replayed after a database leak.

Private material stays local

Credential keys are generated and used inside the authenticator boundary; only signed responses cross USB.

Recovery is designed in

Register a backup authenticator with every important service so a lost key does not become an account-recovery event.

Release discipline

Hardware claims have to survive hardware tests.

The specification remains a target until interoperability, security, and reliability evidence supports a public release.

Validation pending

Protocol interoperability

Run the official FIDO conformance tooling against the final CTAP and WebAuthn target.

Independent security review

Threat-model the firmware and hardware boundaries, then validate them outside the implementation team.

Production-equivalent reliability

Verify connector life, electrostatic-discharge tolerance, and enclosure durability on final-form units.